Unemployment in the EU, for example, has risen from 7.1 per cent in 2008 to 9.6 per cent in 2011 while youth unemployment (those aged up to twenty-five) has increased by 5.7 per cent since 2007 to a high of 21.4 per cent in 2011 and there remains no clear answer as to how to reverse this trend. It was this rise in unemployment which brought together speakers and guests from all over Europe for a Citizen’s Controversy debate: How to Switch from Jobless Growth to Growthless Jobs? The debate was moderated by Pierre Defraigne, the Executive Director of the Madariaga College of Europe Foundation where the debate was held, and the two speakers were Joep Konings, Professor of Economics at the University of Leuven, and Stefano Scarpetta, Head of Employment and Policy Division at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Jobs CC BY photologue_np

The Unemployment Problem

Many interesting and contrasting views were expressed during the debate which will be published in a report by Madariaga. In this blog I will outline a few of the issues which arose. Firstly, it was stressed that the problem is not simply that more people, especially young people, are unemployed. The percentage of those people without a job who are long-term unemployed – that is for twelve months or longer – is increasing rapidly. This creates further problems as the labour market continues to adapt and move forward and the long-term unemployed require ever-increasing levels of training to re-enter the job market. It is not simply about creating new jobs but also ensuring that those in need of work have the right skills.

Secondly, as many Member States artificially solve the crisis by offering incentives to businesses to increase their workforce, other problems arise. Underemployment, those who are employed but do not earn enough to cover their living expenses; skills mismatch, where people are overqualified for their job; and lack of training, where the jobs created do not match the skills set of those seeking employment, are all at risk of increasing in this situation. Encouraging businesses to spur employment is a useful short-term solution but must be combined with other policies in order to make real improvements.

A third key point was made that the relationship between economic growth and employment is not as clear-cut as many assume. While the European economies are gradually recovering, unemployment rates are not following suit. For example, OECD statistics show that employment levels in Germany remained level in 2009 although the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 4.7 per cent, while in 2010 the Netherlands experienced a 1.8 per cent growth in GDP and a 0.5 per cent drop in employment. There is a correlation between GDP and employment figures, but, as was stressed at the debate, economic growth is not enough to create employment growth.

Finally, the subject of inequality was raised. There was certainly not enough time in a ninety minute debate to fully examine the effect that increased unemployment has on income inequality across Europe, nevertheless some important issues arose. An OECD report produced in 2011 shows that income inequality is increasing in the majority of countries; within the EU the Nordic countries showed the greatest increase in income inequality. Unemployment, and many of the measures used to tackle it, often increases this income gap, especially as welfare and education spending is cut.

The Solution?

With such multifaceted, interconnecting issues, what can be done? The challenge is to combine a number of policies which together can spur and stabilise economic and employment growth. The first step is to protect those who are unemployed from falling into poverty by providing adequate social services and benefits coupled with supporting job seekers through training tailored to the job market. Alongside this there is a need to provide and encourage life-long learning. Education and on-the-job training need to be widely available and must adapt to market needs so as to encourage businesses to grow and reduce the risk of long-term unemployment in the future.

At a wider level what is needed is growth which focuses on quality rather than quantity and tax systems which complement this. What this means is that governments cannot blindly strive for continued economic growth if this is not secured by growth in other areas like education and healthcare. Tax systems then need to reflect this. This requires new forms of taxation which offer companies incentives to look to long-term, stable expansion as well as increasing their workforce and which encourages the redistribution of wealth throughout society.

There is no single solution to the unemployment problem in Europe. No magic wand governments can wave to get people back into jobs. The problem is not just a lack of jobs, and therefore cannot be solved by focusing on economic growth alone. The Citizen’s Controversy debate has not provided all the answers; that was not its intention. What it has done is open up the issue to a wider audience and provoked an important discussion which we hope will encourage the EU and its Member States to consider new ways of producing growthless jobs.

To be continued…

While the debate certainly brought some important new insights to light, it is important also to mention some key issues which were not addressed. Firstly, the discussions on growth and why we need to move away from purely economic growth included no reference to the environment. Certainly we cannot continue to push for economic growth at the expense of wider social issues, but we must also consider how this growth affects our environment. As Member States attempt to reform their economic policies to ensure a more stable future and prevent future recession, now is the time to include resource efficiency, climate change, and environmental sustainability in these reforms. By moving the focus away from short-term economic goals towards long-term sustainable growth, Member States could make real, positive steps towards achieving the 20-20-20 goals of reduced energy consumption, greater use of renewable energy, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions.

As has been mentioned, high unemployment is not simply the result of a lack of jobs, and several explanations for this were put forward. What was missed, however, was the problem of job distribution. Alongside increasing unemployment there are many people who are either working very long hours or are expected to do far more work than they are capable of. A better redistribution of this work would help those who are unemployed as well as those who are overworked.

Finally, any discussion of employment should include mention of exploitation. As people become increasingly desperate for work, some employers use this desperation to offer internships and work experience – especially to young people who are both less experienced and more likely to be unemployed – without paying them for their work. While many employees gain valuable experience from this type of work, others are simply used as a money saving tool by employers.

The inclusion of income inequality in this debate was welcomed; indeed the point was made that, considering what a huge issue inequality is, it is so often disregarded by governments in the EU. The reason for this is that there is simply not enough awareness of the enormous negative impact that an increasing income gap has on all areas of society. In their book The Spirit Level, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett offer some hugely compelling arguments, backed up by extensive research, which show exactly how far-reaching the effects are.

What is not widely understood is that quality of life is not simply about how much money you and your loved ones may have. In a society with high levels of income inequality it is not simply those who are poorer who suffer; the quality of life for the whole society is reduced. The book, and the website which accompanies it, provides data showing the detrimental effects inequality has on mental and physical health, social relations, crime rates, violence, criminal justice, education, drug use and many other areas of society. Clearly all of these factors put a huge burden on public finances which Member States are urgently trying to keep under control. Allowing economies to grow without attempting to reduce income inequality will result in further social problems across all levels of society. By addressing the issue now, however, governments can reduce this burden on public finances and, more importantly, improve the lives of those on every rung of the social ladder.

The usufruct rule of international law says that “The Occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.”[1]

Israel’s Supreme Court asserted that:

a. “the article requires the occupying power to ‘safeguard the capital’ of the occupied party’s natural resources” but “that Israel’s use of the quarries is limited and does not amount to destroying their ‘capital.’”[2]

b. “it is necessary to take account of the fact that the West Bank has been under a prolonged and continuing occupation, so the territory’s economic development cannot be put on ice until the occupation ends.”[3]

The Supreme Court has decided that the long-term nature of the occupation means that international law does not apply. Specifically in this case, the rules of usufruct as noted in the Fourth Hague Convention are considered obsolete. Not only is Israel ignoring international law but this ruling exposes how Israel already views the West Bank and its natural resources as its own to exploit. It is in situations such as this, where the nature of occupation is long-standing and therefore most open to abuse, that international law should be considered of the utmost importance.

This ruling is but one recent, glaring example of the impact of the occupation on the Palestinian environment. Over the past five decades, Israeli policies have had a huge impact on the Palestinian environment, depleting its natural resources and degrading the land, air and water. It’s a crisis which is often overlooked in the complex Middle East Peace Process despite its intimate connection to the problems in the region.

The environmental crisis both causes and perpetuates the humanitarian crisis in the West Bank inGazaby affecting the livelihoods and quality of life of the Palestinian people:

• The poor management, over-use and pollution of the coastal aquifer now mean that 90-95 per cent of water in Gaza is unfit for human consumption.[4] This environmental disaster has become a humanitarian emergency.
• Widespread attacks by Israeli settlers on ancient olive trees in theWest Bankare not only deforestation but also destroy the livelihoods of Palestinian farmers and families.

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) says that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.” International humanitarian law prohibits many of the Israeli actions (see tables below) which are harming the environment and Palestinian life which depends on it.

The environmental impact of the occupation should not be overlooked because of this intimate nexus, which means that not only are environmental and human problems linked but so are the solutions. For example, joint cooperative water or energy initiatives could build trust between the parties and enable effective and equitable resource management. Tackling settler violence will not only save olive trees but also defuse high tensions between Israeli and Palestinian communities in theWest Bank.

The tables below looks at five environmental issues in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; energy and water, fisheries, olive tree destruction, quarrying, and pollution and toxic waste. It outlines the problem, cites the relevant international law, and notes projects and actors who are working on these areas.

It is clear that the Israeli occupation has had a significant environmental cost to the Palestinian land. Amongst both international institutions and NGOs there is a tendency to overlook the environmental problems or see them as separate to the humanitarian crisis in the OPT and the Middle East Peace Process. But by tackling environmental issues inPalestine, improvements can be made in the human situation and vice versa.

The Supreme Court’s ruling that the rules of usufruct no longer apply sets a dangerous precedent. Not only does it indicate thatIsraelalready views theWest Bankas de facto its own territory, but it also allows Israeli companies and the Israeli Government to continue to exploit and destroy the Palestinian environment that international law asserts it must hold in trust.

As part of the Quartet, the EU must speak out against the environmental cost of the occupation and it must take action to ensure thatIsrael complies with international law to protect both people and planet.

Recommendations to the EU:

• High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton should issue a statement condemning the decision of the Supreme Court and demanding thatIsraelrespects international law. This issue should be taken up with the Israeli Government at the highest levels.
• Ban the import of any stone quarried in theWest Bankby Israeli mining companies.
• Fund projects for sustainable energy production and water management infrastructure, especially inGazaand Area C of theWest Bank.
• Encourage the establishment of a new joint water management board, with equal representation and control for Israelis and Palestinians, to replace the JWC.
• High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton and the European Parliament should speak out against the Israeli policy of preventing fishing beyond 3 nautical miles off the coast ofGaza.
• The EU must demand that the destruction of olive trees and all other forms of settler violence should stop and that the settlers involved in such acts are brought to justice byIsrael.
• The EU should invest in Palestinian olive oil production and encourage olive-tree replanting schemes.
• The EU, in partnership with the international community, should holdIsraelaccountable for the use of toxic weapons inGaza.

The consultation is based on an ‘Issues Paper’, some 19 pages of considerations which might go to developing such a Communication and some 21 Questions which contributors are asked to address.

It is encouraging to see that the Issues Paper says:

‘A key premise of this approach is that social protection supports inclusive growth by enabling people to participate in the economy (p.1).’ This rightly reflects the importance of social protection (that is: welfare benefits, pensions, access to health and social services for those who need them) for inclusive and just societies: indeed, it is one of the key requirements for social and economic justice.

It might be a little ironic that this discussion is ongoing at a time when the very social protection programmes which have characterized the European Social Model since the end of the second World War are coming under increasing pressure in the face of the global financial crisis.

The paper goes on, in the same paragraph to say: ‘that (social protection) enables people to consume, to acquire assets and to make investments’; in other words, social protection contributes to the economic functioning of society. We would not agree that consumption, the acquisition of assets and making investments is the be-all and end-all of a well functioning economy – not at all – but what is meant by this is essentially: it enables participation in the economy by people who would otherwise be excluded from this. It is this ability to participate that goes some way towards economic justice.

It is also important that the European Commission is engaging in this discussion at this point because as social protection comes under pressure in developed countries, there is evidence, again referred to in the Issues Paper (p. 7) that development, growth and increasing wealth in what are referred to as ‘middle income countries’ go hand in hand with ‘persistently high levels of inequality’ and that ‘there are up to a billion poor people, or a ‘new bottom billion’, living not in the world’s poorest countries but in MICs (Middle Income Countries)’ (quoting here from Glassman and Sumner: Global Health and the New Bottom Billion).

Why did QCEA feel it right to make a contribution to this consultation? We were greatly helped by a Quaker from theNetherlands who alerted us to the consultation and assisted in producing an initial draft of the response. We felt that this was an important topic for us to contribute to because:

• It builds on the work we did in recent years on the Mainstreaming of Conflict Prevention in Development Assistance and in particular the report we published in 2009 under the same title and our concerns raised in that report about the potential for budget support (a form of support relevant to social protection programmes) to exacerbate conflict
• It is an issue which requires the EU to address the question of the extent to which its other policies (trade, agriculture, fisheries, energy, etc) potentially or actually undermine the viability of economies in third countries and therefore the contribution to poverty that EU policies make
• It provides us with the opportunity to raise in the context of this consultation the important work done by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett in their groundbreaking research published under the title of The Spirit Level. This shows now inequality in societies also leads to a whole range of other negative social outcomes and how the more equal a society is the better it works for all.

And whilst the consultation questions were not all framed in a way that immediately allowed us to focus on these three very important issues, we have used our response to raise them where this was possible within the constraints of the questionnaire.

QCEA believes that social protection is an important aspect of economic justice; this is true in the EU and elsewhere. And even if social protection here is under increasing pressure, it is right and important that the EU considers its possible contribution to social protection in developing countries because economic justice is indivisible. If there is economic injustice anywhere, there is economic injustice everywhere and we are all implicated.

Seventy-nine responses were submitted by Member State governments, prison administrations, and a wide range of NGOs and Civil Society groups interested in criminal justice, including QCEA. It is disappointing to note that only seventeen of the twenty-seven Member State governments responded to the Green Paper. They answered questions on pre- and post-trial alternatives to custodial sentences; how Member States differ in relation to detention conditions and practices and how these could be better monitored; how mutual trust could be strengthened between Member States; and what role the EU could play in this area. There was also a specific question on the detention of children. The questions produced a range of varied and valuable responses. However, three key issues stand-out as most important for an assessment of mutual trust in criminal justice.

The first issue – and one which invited a range of reactions – was whether there would be benefit in setting minimum detention standards and maximum time limits on pre-trial detention. With detention conditions and pre-trial practices varying so much across the EU, on the surface of it there would certainly appear to be merit in EU-wide regulation. Indeed, when asked whether Member States would benefit from binding maximum pre-trial detention periods it was described by two respondents – an NGO working on drug addiction and a law society – as ‘a matter of the utmost importance’ and ‘necessary and even urgent’. The Belgian Ministry of Justice illuminates this problem: they write that the number of people held in pre-trial detention in 2010 was at thirty-three per cent of the total number imprisoned.

The solution, however, is not so straightforward. Many Member State governments argued that this was outside of the EU remit. The Polish Ministry of Justice, for example, write that such measures would ‘require an extensive unification’ of criminal proceedings in Member States ‘which does not seem feasible at the moment in the context of the powers of the European Union’. Similarly, with international regulations and guidelines in this area already in existence in the Council of Europe and the United Nations, it is not simply a case of creating new regulation at EU level. What is needed is for Member States to be encouraged and assisted in implementing these regulations nationally. Similarly, some countries, such as Finland, have no maximum time limit on pre-trial detention and yet it boasts among the shortest average time spent in custody pre-trial at 3.5 months. There is also a fear that EU-wide maximum time limits may create a situation where the maximum time becomes the norm, with little incentive to reduce this.

The issue of alternatives to detention, both pre- and post-trial, also attracted very varied responses. Member State governments were keen to list the variety of alternatives in place in their countries and how effective they are. It was also highlighted that pre-trial detention cost Europe €5.2 billion in 2006 while alternatives cost far less. Electronic Monitoring, or tagging, was frequently cited as an alternative in many Member States. France, for example, currently has 8,140 convicted persons who were electronically tagged out of 71,742 in total. Successful electronic monitoring systems, combined with other programmes such as drug rehabilitation or community service, offer a cheaper and more rehabilitative option to a prison sentence.

However, many of the other responses were less enthusiastic about the current use of alternatives across the EU. First, there are problems with implementation which limit their success. The initial costs of applying electronic monitoring can prove too high for many Member States and often the technology involved is not adequate. For instance in Belgium the system is in place but the tags can only signal that a person is out of range of their transmitter and not where they have been. There are also serious questions about the very damaging effects of electronic tagging as an alternative to detention. Ban Public, an association facilitating communication on incarceration, writes that wearing an electronic bracelet for more than a year can lead to clinical depression for the wearer. Similarly, Caritas France, states that this distress can become so bad that the sufferers ask to be returned to prison. As with conditions and time limits, what is needed with alternatives to detention is not more legislation but more research into the proper use of existing legislation.

Finally to what can be done at EU level. The government responses were divided on the issue of whether it was necessary or even appropriate to have further EU control over Member States’ judicial legislation. By focusing on the possibility of more legislation at European level, the Green Paper is missing more basic issues, and this was highlighted by many of the non-governmental responses. The Council of Europe already has guidelines in place, not only with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but also through the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) which carries out visits to prisons across Europe, helping protect citizens and monitor prison conditions. The UN has a similar optional protocol called Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (OPCAT). States which ratify the OPCAT are required to implement National Preventive Mechanisms within thirteen months of ratification which are designed to monitor conditions in all places of detention. Four EU Member States have still not signed the OPCAT, while seven more have signed but not yet ratified it.

The focus therefore needs to shift from creating new guidelines towards ensuring those already existing are complied with, and three suggestions from the responses stand out here. The first is that, instead of creating new laws, the EU could support Member States financially and practically in their judicial procedures to help them instigate effective alternatives to imprisonment, speed up trial processes to reduce pre-trial detention periods and improve prison conditions. One response also suggests that EU institutions could ‘engage in mass campaigns to disseminate data on the effectiveness of alternative measures’ to increase public support for alternatives which often receive negative press. Change also needs to occur from the bottom up. Legislation is only as effective as those who implement it. This means judges, prison administrators, and all those involved in the judiciary are helped with training, exchange of best practice, and given the tools in order to carry out their responsibilities. Finally, the scope for change must widen if real improvements in mutual trust are to be made. As the Irish Ministry of Justice highlights, ‘prison detention conditions cannot be dealt with in isolation from other challenges facing the country’.  Mutual trust cannot be strengthened simply through EU legislation; real change has to be made at all levels, and it is hoped that the European Commission will consider this when shaping the future of EU criminal justice.

Denmark is as different a European country as is possible from Poland, who has just completed its six month rotation. Poland’s reliance on coal fired power plants, its increasing exploration for shale gas, and its opposition to stronger emission cuts was to the detriment of Europe’s environmental interests and it is hoped that Denmark can set the EU back on track with binding targets on resource efficiency and emissions reductions.

Danish Environment Minister Ida Auken (who spoke at the European Parliament Water Group meeting) and Energy and European Affairs Ministers Martin Lindegaard and Nikolai Wammen (who spoke at European Policy Centre (EPC) events), have been busy promoting the greening of the economy to support renewables and energy efficiency. The ministers emphasised resource efficiency as an inclusive concept, including water, steel and land along with energy to create a more comprehensive idea of efficiency which they called “eco-efficiency”.

Eco Efficiency:

Through combining resource efficiency and water efficiency with energy efficiency, the Ministers looked at ways of combating the ‘three crises: economic, resource, and energy.’ The three can be worked out together so long as one is not separated out from the other, they insisted. “We need growth, so why not make it green?” Lindegaard, speaking at an EPC Breakfast Policy Briefing, highlighted that, “failure to take the right decisions now will prove very costly in the long term.”

Another theme of the Danish Ministers was innovation. Lindegaard highlighted that this was simply not possible if only advocated by the public sector, stating that a considerably larger proportion of the money circulating in the world was private, not public. Wammen, speaking at another EPC Conference on a recent publication – ‘Green Revolution: making eco-efficiency a driver for growth’, said that if investment came from Private Public Partnerships (PPPs) ‘dreams can become a reality’. Wammen also highlighted the need to create and keep jobs and innovation in Europe and help combat the currently overwhelming Chinese market, which has recently overtaken Germany to become the biggest global supplier of solar panels worldwide. An incredible 1.5 million jobs could be created through the 2050 Energy Roadmap, and another 2 million through the Energy Efficiency Directive, said Wammen. What possible excuse does the EU have not to follow these employment opportunities through?

Simply following the initiatives already laid out by the Commission may not be enough to cement a resource efficient, high employment future. The Chair of the Parliament’s Environment Committee, Jo Leinen, MEP, urged the Commission to draw up legislation on resource efficiency, stating that “… it won’t be done without targets.”

CC-BYSA Jens Schott Knudsen, Flag in the Water

Yes, we are talking about money; what else; but not the Eurozone crisis or even the financial crisis. What we are talking about is the EU budget.

QCEA has written about the way the EU budget is formulated in seven year Multiannual Financial Frameworks elsewhere. Just to recap: although the EU has annual budgets, they are set within these Multiannual Financial Frameworks which are not developed on a rolling basis but rather renegotiated every seven years. Generally the process takes 18 months or so, although on the last occasion this happened, it took nearly two years. And on that occasion, the only way in which the negotiations could be concluded was to agree a thorough review both of the EU budget and separately and specifically, the Common Agricultural Policy.

That review took place between 2007 and 2010 and culminated in a Communication from the European Commission in October 2011. This was the basis on which the European Commission then made proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014 to 2020.

So what happens when the Commission puts forward such a proposal? This is a legislative proposal. That means that the European Union needs to make legislation to implement the proposal in the form in which it is proposed or in an amended form. The process involves both the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

Here, we will talk about the Council of the European Union and its work on this issue.

The Council of the European Union is basically the Institution where Member States’ governments work together. It operates in different so-called ‘configurations’ which bring together the relevant Ministers of the Member States’ governments.

The Multiannual Financial Framework affects all aspects of the European Union and therefore all the different configurations of the Council will deal with different elements of it. However, and because of its overarching importance, the General Affairs Council, which brings together theMemberStates’ Foreign and/or Europe Ministers, takes overall responsibility for this process.

Their meetings, when they discuss legislative matters, are open to the public. Attending in person may not be practical for many citizens. Even as someone based inBrussels, not five minutes away from their meeting place, I have not personally attended any of these meetings. But there is another way of hearing first hand, from the horses’ mouths as it were, what they are saying. Their discussions are webstreamed.

The General Affairs Council has so far had two meetings which have dealt with the Commission Proposals.

The first, still under the Polish Presidency, took place on 15 November 2011. As you can see on the picture, the webcast  opens in an ordinary webcast window with the normal controls. The one you may not be familiar with is the bit that says ‘ori’ and has a little upward arrow. If you click on that arrow, you can then choose your language to get interpretation for the contributions made by the speakers who can speak in any of the official languages of the EU.

For each of the discussions, the Presidency prepares an introductory document which frames the discussion. For the discussion on 15 November 2011, the questions put by the Presidency were related to the cohesion policy, the ‘Connecting Europe Facility’, the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy. A background document is also provided.

The second discussion took place on 27 January 2012. This one was chaired by the Danish Presidency which began on 1 January 2012. The background document to this debate sets out only two questions: what are the main priorities and what are Member States’ views on the overall amount proposed for the 7-year budget by the European Commission.

In his conclusions to the debate, the Danish Minister for European Affairs, Nicolai Wammen, indicated that the discussions would not be easy.

The first thing to note is that every single Member State stated that the discussions around this Multiannual Financial Framework has to be seen in the context of the current economic crisis; the words austerity, fiscal constraints, and reductions in spending were mentioned over and over again. Whilst this is understandable – the meeting did, after all, take place just days before a European Council meeting which was aimed at bringing the Eurozone crisis under control – it is also important to remember that the Framework being discussed will determine EU spending from 2014 to 2020 and that immediate constraints therefore need to be put in relation to that time frame. The other concern with this approach from Member States is that the austerity response to the financial crisis is not necessarily the best response and this view is gaining ground.

There are several conflicting and contradictory positions emerging amongst Member States – none of them really surprising – but which will make agreement in a context where ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ – a principle which was reiterated by several Ministers – even more difficult.

Several Member States, referring to a joint letter sent in December 2010 by a number of Member States including theUK,Germany andFrance, stated that they would require a significant cut in the proposed budget framework. Over and over, Member States said that this budget is at least € 100 billion too high.

On the other hand, other Member States were clearly indicating that they felt the budget proposal put forward by the European Commission was about right, well balanced, and had already taken an approach that reflected the constraints that would have to be imposed on public spending.

There was some discussion about whether the budget should be agreed on a ‘top-down’ basis (i.e. first we decide how much money there is and then we decide what we do with it, or how we divide up the pie) or on a ‘bottom-up’ basis (i.e. first we decide what we need to/want to do and then we decide how much money this requires). The Member States who feel the proposal is too high were all supporting the top-down approach.

The priorities set out by Member States are even more predictable. TheUKwon’t see its rebate cut;France(andSpainand several of the newer Member States) won’t see the Common Agricultural Policy reduced; newer Member States want adjustments in the Common Agricultural Policy which will end the higher direct payments available to farmers in the old Member States. All agree that the priority has to be growth and jobs but how quite how you get there is a disputed point.

Some Member States argued that agricultural subsidies would not create new jobs; other argued that the cohesion policy does (or does not, depending on where you are from) contributes significantly to growth and jobs.

It is a little surprising, maybe, that the emphasis on research which has been in much of the discussion during the budget review and which has been in public debate was not echoed in this debate; but it was mentioned and it may be that Ministers take this as read.

Reference to the green agenda, climate action and related issues was noticeable by its absence from the discussion.

But the underlying theme from the perspective of a citizen still has to be: everyone is defending ‘their’ corner – maybe with the notable exceptions of Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Bulgaria who had more of a European theme in their contributions – as if it is all about ‘how much do I get out’ rather than how do we achieve solidarity across the EU as a whole.

There will be many more debates in the coming months about this issue in the General Affairs Council and elsewhere in the Council Structures. It is a debate that is worth following, because in the end, it will be the Member States who will drive the decision on this.

The European Parliament has a role in the process, but it is not as powerful as the Council of the European Union. So the Council is where our attention should be focused. So I recommend that you watch these debates to see how decisions are really made inBrussels. And then you can hold your government to account for what they contribute to the decision-making or the decision-blocking.

Beit Arabiya - The Peace House cc Martina Weitsch

Israeli authorities demolished Beit Arabiya (“Arabiya’s House”) last night (Monday, January 23^rd) for the fifth time, along with structures in the East Anata Bedouin compound.  Beit Arabiya, Located in the West Bank town of Anata (Area C) just to the northeast of Jerusalem, is a living symbol of resistance to Occupation and the desire for justice and peace.

Thus reads the beginning of a news report from the International Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), an Israeli NGO.

When QCEA’s Council sent a delegation of 10 Council Members and the two Joint

Members of the QCEA Group June 2009 at Beit Arabiya cc Martina Weitsch

Representatives on a study visit to Israel and Palestine in June 2009, we met with Director of ICHAD, Dr. Jeff Halper. He took us on a tour of the area around East Jerusalem and we visited Beit Arabiya. We were welcomed by the family who told us of the four demolitions of their home and their decision to make it a house for peace, to welcome those who want to work for peace and to engage in dialogue. We heard even then that the house was under threat of a further demolition.

Salim Shawamreh who lives there with his wife Arabiya and their children told us that:

• He is in favour of planning regulations and building permits in principle.
• He had grown up in a refugee camp in Jerusalem, had moved to Saudi Arabia to work for some years and when he came back, wanted to build a house for himself and his family. He bought a plot of land on the edge of East Jerusalem just in Area C.
• He applied for permission to build; each application costs $ 5000; he was refused; he applied again, and again, and in the end, he realised that he would not get permission. Different reasons were given each time.
• He built the house; it had (at the time of our visit) been demolished 4 times; it had been rebuilt each time. The price paid by his family, both in actual money (the owners have to pay for the demolition and a fine) and in trauma to the whole family is unimaginable.

The reasons given for refusing permission to build included: the house would be built on agricultural land and that the house would be built on a hill; we saw the house and the land it is built on and the landscape around it. This is a rocky desert, not agricultural land. And yes, it is a hill side; but I guess the world is full of buildings on hill sides. So how is that a reason for withholding planning consent?

The Peace House with rocky hills behind cc Penny Heymans

Another reason given was that there are two signatures missing on a document. But the authorities could not say whose signatures were missing. When Salim provided the signatures of all the people in the village giving their consent to the building of the house, the document was lost.

We were very concerned that the fifth demolition would happen and immediately on our return wrote to decision-makers in the European Union Institutions to ask them to use their good offices to prevent a further demolition.

Now, the demolition has happened again. But of course, this is not an isolated case. UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees publishes statistics of house demolitions regularly. Their most up to date report for last year (2011) shows that in total 493 structures (including houses) were demolished in Area C of the West Bank and 22 were demolished in East Jerusalem. In total this led to the displacement of 923 people in Area C and 67 in East Jerusalem. Of these, 507 and 41 respectively were children.

Article 53 of the 4th Geneva Convention prohibits  ’any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations’ ‘except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations’.

Of course, in the case of Area C the Israeli Authorities are using planning law to justify the demolitions. But as they are not giving planning permits to Palestinians they are forcing Palestinians to break planning law or move away. A very detailed account of these issues can be found in several reports by ICAHD all available on their website.

The renewed demolition of Beit Arabiya must be the trigger for public protest the world over against the occupation and the against the suffering imposed on Palestinian people, not only because imposing this suffering is wrong, not only because it is illegal but maybe even more importantly because the ongoing suffering is a major obstacle to peace.

Change is necessary,  in the policy of the Israeli government with regard to house demolition and in the approach the European Union and its Member States take to the ongoing demolitions. We must tell decision-makers that we expect that change. We must write to our Members of Parliament and ask them to demand explanations from our Foreign Ministries about the response they are making to these demolitions; we must write to our Members of the European Parliament and ask them to demand explanations from the European External Action Service.  If we do nothing, the demolitions and the suffering will go on.

Decision-making process in a nutshell

Lots of people don’t really know how decisions are made in the EU and by whom. That’s hardly surprising given the lack of information available and the misinformation peddled by the media. So here is the short version:

For matters which the EU decides (i.e. things where the Member States have agreed that decisions should be made at EU level):

• The European Commission makes proposals for legislation (often at the suggestion of the Council of the European Union – see below)
• The Council of the European Union and the European Parliament both have to agree to the proposal

The Council of the European Union is the governments of the Member States working together. The European Parliament is the people elected to that role directly by the citizens of the 27 Member States.

How does that actually work in the Council of the European Union?

The European Parliament works much like other parliaments through a series of committees and makes final decisions in plenary sittings. All that is well documented and in the public domain and there is a wealth of information available on the European Parliament website. This post isn’t about that.

The situation in the Council of the European Union is more complicated.

What we see – if we follow these issues – are reports of summits of the senior politicians meeting from time to time, usually in Brussels. But we all understand that this isn’t where the nitty gritty gets discussed and resolved. And this isn’t the Council of the European Union; it’s the European Council.

We may also see – from time to time and if there is something particularly newsworthy happening – reports from meetings of government ministers from the Member States. Again, and whilst these are important, they aren’t where the detail gets discussed.

The Permanent Representations

The key to understanding how it all works is to know that eachMemberStateof the EU has what is called a Permanent Representation inBrussels. These are, to all intents and purposes, embassies. They are called Permanent Representations because they represent the Member State to an international institution rather than to another country’s government.

Each of the Permanent Representations is headed up by an Ambassador who generally has a Deputy; in most cases, there is a third Ambassador with responsibility for matters of  EU Foreign Policy.

But even these three representatives can’t do it all. And how do they work together across 27 Member States and cover all the different aspects of EU policy.

Well, when in doubt, look for a committee – but in this case, it’s not just one or two, it is lots of Committees and working parties.

The Council Preparatory Bodies

Yes, that’s what they are called, and there’s a whole long list of them. Their membership varies but in principle, each of them has representatives from all Member States and each of them has representatives from the European Commission. The Member States’ representatives can be diplomats or civil servants who can be based either in the Permanent Representation or in the capital of the Member State. The actual membership of each of these groups is sometimes hard to establish although at the higher levels of these groups the staff lists of the Permanent Representations give relevant information.

And they come in the form of:

• Committees established by the Treaties
• One Committee established by intergovernmental Decision
• Committees established by Council Act
• Committees relating to specific policy areas

The first three groups warrant a little bit of a closer look.

Committees established by the Treaties

These are Committees which are enshrined in the Treaties which govern the EU and therefore have to exist and to function as set out in the relevant Articles of the Treaties. They are the top level of Council Preparatory Bodies.

The top level of these is called Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and exists in two parts: Part II brings together the Ambassadors of the Member States; Part I brings together the Deputy Ambassadors of the Member States.

Other committees in the category are: the Economic and Financial Committee, an advisory body established under Article 134 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; the Employment Committee, also an advisory body and established under Article 150 of the same Treaty; both of them advise both the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

Then there is the Trade Policy Committee (which has a number of subgroups); it ‘assists the European Commission in the negotiation of trade agreements and advises the Commission on the common commercial policy’[1].

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) brings together the Ambassadors of theMemberStatesresponsible for EU foreign policy issues;

The Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) is established under Article 71 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The Social Protection Committee is established under Article 160 of the same Treaty. It also operates as an advisory body to both the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

In all cases, the establishing Article sets out the purpose of the Committee.

The one and only Committee established by Intergovernmental Decision is the Special Committee on Agriculture. The purpose of this committee is to prepare decisions of the Agriculture Council (i.e. the Council of the European Union constellation dealing with agriculture).

Committees Established by Council Act

• The EU Military Committee (EUMC) which governs the military aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy
• The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) which is responsible for the civilian aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy
• The Economic Policy Committee
• The Financial Services Committee
• The Security Committee

Groups closely associated with the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER)

The Antici Group; this is named after its Italian founder and is responsible for deciding on the organization of COREPER II proceedings.

The Mertens Group; this fulfills the same role for COREPER I as the Antici group fulfills for COREPER II.

The Friends of the Presidency Group which appears to have a wide remit; I have found lots of references to it on the internet but nothing that would detail its role or terms of reference or membership.

Other Groups

Counsellors/Attachés meet, though again, it is not clear what their specific remit is (the implication is that this is a meeting which is not specifically policy related).

Policy Related Committees and Groups

There are a long list of Committees and Groups which work on specific issues relating to different policy areas. There are too many to list here but the following is a summary:

The total number is far smaller than the number of such groups that gets bandied about in discussion about the workings of the Council of the European Union. But 143 is still substantial. Add to this all the groups set out above and not in the table (another 18). If each of the groups has a minimum of one representative from each Member State and one representative from the European Commission, then the minimum number of people meeting and discussing important  (if detailed) policy issues at EU level, all of which contribute to decision making, is somewhere in the order of 4500.

So who are these decision-makers?

Most of these people are diplomats or civil servants of the Member States. So they haven’t been elected but they have been appointed through the relevant mechanisms of the governments of the Member States. So who are they? And how can you find out?

Public information about all of this is a bit thin on the ground. The list of groups is public. It gives an overview of the types of things that get discussed in these groups. It has quite substantial footnotes relating to decisions which led to the formation of the groups and so some of the background and context can be traced.

There is no list of the members of all of these groups. Tracking them down is possible in some cases from the staff lists of the Permanent Representations. But they aren’t that easy to come by either. The list of the Permanent Representations can be accessed via the Council of the European Union website. But they do not all provide helpful links to the roles of staff. So it is then necessary to find the website of each Permanent Representation which is not always straightforward. And even once on their website, the information about who does what is not that straightforward. They don’t necessarily say who represents them on which of these groups. And if the representative of a Member State on a group is not based in Brussels, they wouldn’t be on that list at all.

There is, of course, another way to get at the information. If you know which of the groups you are interested in, you can try to get the name of the relevant official from the government of the Member State in question. If you are a voting citizen of that country, this should be possible, either directly by approaching the government department concerned or by asking a Member of Parliament (at national level) to find out for you.

And why is it important to know?

All decisions made by the Council of the European Union are made, in the end, at the level of government ministers. But clearly they can’t deal with all the detail, so many decisions are pre-digested at different levels of working groups and committees and put to ministers for approval on the basis that agreement has been reached at a lower level.

And we all know that often the devil is in the detail and that it is therefore important that there is at least the potential for transparency of the decision-making at that (lower) level.

It is important to be able to ask people who know (because they were there) why certain decisions were made in the way they were made.

To do that, it is necessary to know who the decision-makers really are. It is good that the detail is dealt with at a level where people hopefully have both the expertise and the time to delve into the detail. But if they have no real accountability because they are well shielded from public view, do they have enough of an incentive to make all their decisions on the basis of a commonly accepted basis of what the ‘common good’ is? Or can national, sectoral, and industry interests sway such decisions – maybe for the better, maybe for the worse – but often unnoticed and unchallenged.

European Foreign Policy matters. The European Union encompasses 27 countries, representing 500 million people, 25 per cent of the world’s GDP and 20 per cent of the world’s trade. What the European Union does outside of its borders is important for billions of people the world over. So the establishment of the European External Action Service just over a year ago in December 2010 is not to be seen as just some bureaucratic issue that only affectsBrussels.

How the European Union does foreign policy and who does the foreign policy day to day critically affects the agenda, the methods and the outcomes.

In December 2010, QCEA cautiously welcomed the establishment of the EEAS and set out the many challenges it faced at that crucial moment: organisational issues, budget issues, recruitment and training issues, and the daily working routines in teams that have multiple lines of accountability.

In December 2011, Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice President of the European Commission, published a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on progress made.

Two things are striking: the report was published on 22 December 2011, a date which could look as if it was intended to give it as little publicity as possible. The other is that the Foreign Ministers of 12 Member States wrote to the High Representative on 8 December 2011 setting out only thinly veiled criticism of the progress made and of Catherine Ashton’s leadership of the EEAS in what is referred to as a non-paper.

Indeed, Catherine Ashton’s report refers to this non-paper in her report.

The context

Ashton’s report is rather defensive in its approach, a point which is jumped on by various press articles in the European Voice. She sets out as part of the political context the foreign policy challenges that she and the Service have faced, but without being clear about what she and her Service have achieved with regard to any of them.

The first of the challenges she names is the global economic crisis and the tensions within the euro zone. It is instructive that this is her first thought on the political context because it is probably the one element of the political context of the year that she and her Service have had least to do with.

The second challenge she cites is the Arab Spring. This was (and still is), indeed, a significant challenge to the European Union as it rewrites its approach and agenda against the backdrop of European engagement with the former dictatorships in these countries. There is no question that the EEAS responded quickly and has done its best to extract credibility from that reaction against a rather unhelpful history. To some extent that succeeded. But the NATO response inLibyaand the splits between Member States of the EU with regard to this also showed up once again how divided the 27 Member States are on key foreign policy issues.

The third challenge she lists is the acute budget pressure faced by MemberStatesand the consequences this has for the diplomatic services of Member States. She says, possibly referring to all of these challenges, but possibly only referring to the budget pressures – it is not clear from the text – that this is ‘hardly the ideal backdrop for the launch of a new service for the external relations of the Union’[1]. This is a strange and very defensive statement indeed. All three challenges should provide an ideal context in which to demonstrate the importance of a coherent and coordinated approach to foreign policy within the European Union. But even if this statement were meant only to refer to the budget pressures: what better time to demonstrate that a diplomatic service at European Union level could actually provide some economies of scale and thus savings at national level without loss of effectiveness.

Agenda setting

One of the key roles the High Representative has is to set the agenda for the EU’s foreign policy. This role, previously taken by the rotating presidency, is vital. It involves both preparing and chairing the Foreign Affairs Council and providing the chairs of the foreign policy working groups from within the EEAS. These chairs, in turn, set the agenda for their working groups and are thus equally well placed to drive forward the priorities set by the High Representative.

She has appointed the chairs of all these working groups: The Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CICOM), the Politico-Military Group, the Africa Working Party (COAFR), The Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST), the Working Party on the Western Balkans (COWEB), the Working Party on the OSCE (COSCE), the Mashreq/Maghreb Working Party (MAMA), the ad hoc Working Party on the Middle East Peace Process (COMEP), the Working Party on Transatlantic Relations (COTRA), the Working Party on Latin America (COLAT), the United Nations Working Party (CONUN), the Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM), the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM), the Working Party on Non-Proliferation (CONOP), and the Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN).

But in the non-paper, the Foreign Ministers of 12 Member States suggest that there might be ways to further optimize the identification of political priorities and that annual agenda planning for the Foreign Affairs Council (and that would, of necessity involve similar and coordinated planning in the working groups) could be an important tool.

So there is room for improvement and such improvement could put the EEAS and therefore the EU into a position where it can be more proactive and less reactive in terms of its foreign policy.

Representation at the UN

The EU is not a member of the UN. Its 27 Member States are, with two of them (Franceand theUK) permanent members of the Security Council. Other EU Member States can be elected to the ten non-permanent seats. At present,GermanyandPortugalare among the non-permanent members (until the end of 2012). This makes it harder for the EU to be seen as ‘one voice’ at UN level and there have been a number of cases where different EU Member States have taken very different positions at UN level.

In May 2011 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution which gives the EU an upgraded status allowing its representatives to make interventions during sessions; they can be invited to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly; and EU communications which relate to the work of the Assembly can be circulated as documents of the Assembly. In short, it gives the EU the possibility to present a common position.

One voice?

Geographical Desks

There is an agreement that the geographical desks – i.e. the officials who provide geographical expertise with regard to third countries are maintained in the EEAS. This means that they also provide briefing material on those countries to senior EU actors outside of the EEAS. The report sets out that briefing requests during the period 1 January 2011 to 30 September 2011 were handled by the geographic desks as follows:

• High Representative (Ashton) 243
• President of the European Council (Van Rompuy) 67
• President of the European Commission (Barroso) 125
• European Commissioner: Enlargement and Neighbourhood 235

What is interesting is the absence of the Commissioners for Development, for Humanitarian Assistance, for Trade and for Research (to name only the most obvious Commission portfolios with interaction with third countries); evidently, they did not request or receive briefings from the EEAS. That begs the question as to whether they have geographic desks/specialists in their own Directorates General.

Management of Funding

The EEAS is not just about Foreign Policy, it is also about External Action. For those less familiar with the finer distinctions of EU policy and the EU Treaties, this may be a confusing idea. What’s the difference between Foreign Policy and External Action? This is not the place to go into detail but essentially, and for the purpose of this discussion, this relates specifically to development cooperation (and the funding of that cooperation), the financial assistance available to countries in the European Neighbourhood, the financial assistance available to countries that are likely to join the European Union in the medium term, and the support for crisis management and peacebuilding and conflict prevention. All this is funded through a range of so-called Financial Instruments.

Prior to the advent of the EEAS, policies were made and funds managed as follows:

The EEAS was intended to consolidate the Foreign Policy and External Action work of the European Union and it therefore could be expected that the management of the funding had been, similarly, consolidated. The picture now is, however:

Ashton refers to this not totally streamlined situation only with reference to the creation of the Foreign Policy Instruments Service and she says: ‘Taking account of the constraints, the cooperation between this service and the relevant EEAS departments is satisfactory, but there remain challenges in ensuring sufficient flexibility and responsiveness in implementing urgent measures in crisis situations given the constraints of the financial regulation.’[2] Given that this Service is quite a small team this less than glowing statement about its integration into the overall scheme of things is suggesting that not even some fairly basic organizational management issues have passed without potentially serious problems.

Inter-institutional Relationships

The 12 Foreign Ministers in their non-paper do not comment on this issue specifically but remark more generally that cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission could be better. It asks whether the EEAS has the right structures to be integrated into the planning and preparations of key Commission initiatives which have external aspects and dimensions.

What all these rather pedestrian and organizational issues reveal, however, is that the decision to have an EEAS which did not include all possible external relations elements of the European Union (it excluded from the outset issues such as Humanitarian Aid and Trade; it excludes Enlargement and Neighbourhood policy; it excludes the external dimensions of energy policy) is mirrored by evolving structures which do not overcome these structural challenges easily. And the suggestion behind the concerns raised in the non-paper is that good communication (which would at least go some way to ameliorate these shortcomings) is not as well developed as it might be.

EU Delegations

The EU delegations are the diplomatic presence of the EU in third countries. Before the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 they were delegations of the European Commission. They became delegations of the EU on that date and have become a key part of the EEAS; their development in the first year of the EEAS has created a number of key challenges.

All the delegations are staffed by officials from the EEAS and from various European Commission Directorates. Whilst the Head of Delegation is an EEAS official and whilst all delegation staff report directly to the Head of Delegation, those who come from other Directorates also receive instruction from their Directorates in Brussels. This is clearly a challenge in terms of managing a team in a delegation. There is evidence in Ashton’s report and in the non-paper that this does not always work well and that this needs to be improved.

One of the elements of criticism is the implication that Heads of Delegations are not always informed of the instructions their staff receive from Directorates inBrussels. From the point of view of a citizen, reasonably experienced in management tasks, this is nothing short of scandalous. That this has to be addressed in what is – after all – a public report rather than being resolved through a brief discussion and agreement at Commission level and a clear instruction within each of the Directorates of the Commission would be funny if it was not so serious.

Another element that is addressed in both documents is the fact that in some cases Heads of Delegations are bogged down in administrative and financial management tasks (including signing off payments) simply because they are the only officials from the EEAS (as opposed to Commission Directorates) in the Delegation and because they cannot delegate such financial/administrative tasks to officials from the Commission. The fact that 12 Foreign Ministers need to take the time to point out (in their non-paper) that the Financial Regulations which cause this farcical situation need to be changed is beyond belief.

Other Managerial Issues

Ashton’s report then goes into quite a lot of detail on subjects such as the structure, staffing and recruitment, budget and financial management issues. They are, no doubt, all very important. They need to be resolved. The fact that they have not yet been resolved shows that progress has been much slower than might be expected.

This may have more to do with the undue haste with which the Service was set up. During the years since the proposal to establish the EEAS was first put forward (in 2003 in the draft of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty) it has been clear that such a service is necessary and would come about sooner or later. The unwillingness of anyone in the EU Institutions and in the Member States to have coherent preparatory discussions about what this service should look like and what technical, organizational, and personnel issues would have to be resolved, simply because this might have been construed as pre-empting the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, struck QCEA as ill-advised at the time and the lack of progress in the last 12 months on many of these issues has proved that right.

Involvement of Member States

The relationship between the EEAS and the Member States at the most senior level is not really addressed in Ashton’s report.

She does address the question of cooperation between the EU Delegations and the Member State Embassies in third countries. One of the main changes brought about by the introduction of the EEAS is the fact that the responsibilities which were carried out by the Member State Embassy which represents the rotating presidency of the EU are now carried out by the EU delegation. Ashton reports that this has gone ‘remarkable smoothly’[3]. The report suggests that in this regard the Delegations to multilateral organizations (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, etc.) still leave some room for positive developments. From the point of view of the credibility of the EU, it can only be hoped that this happens sooner rather than later.

What is surprising is the reference in paragraph 20 of the report to the issues relating to consular assistance. This, and especially because it is a service clearly visible to citizens, should be resolved quickly and pragmatically.

The non-paper flags up under this heading the need to move towards achieving the one thirdMemberStateofficials in the EEAS agreed under theLisbonTreaty.. The rather specific and detailed recommendations put forward suggest that there is a sense that the processes necessary to make the move from and to the EEAS and from and to Member States diplomatic services has not been fully thought through in practical terms. This could have been addressed  had there been more of a lead time in implementing the Service.

But beyond these ‘nitty-gritty’ issues, there must be a question about the relationship between Ashton and the Foreign Ministers of Member States if 12 of them think it necessary to produce a non-paper in advance of her annual report. The Member States concerned, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, are a broad group and this breadth may reflect a general sense of discontent which does not help to portray the EU as one coherent actor.

Conclusions

There was never any reason not to do some preliminary planning for a structural change which Member States wanted even if there was a slight risk that it might not happen soon.

The result is that for 12 months, during which there have been a number of significant global events, the top brass of the European Union’s Foreign Policy have been bogged down in managing a large scale organizational transition. If nothing else, this has undermined the ability of the EU to be seen as a global actor of consequence.

The EEAS now has 3611 staff, of which about two thirds are working in Delegations and the other one third inBrussels. This is a huge resource and it is hoped that in the coming year and years citizens will see more action, more visibility and more impact.

CC-BYSA Vinoth Chander

Embedded in nearly everything we do, water is a necessity for life. From the coffee we drink to the cotton we wear, it all needs water in order to exist. Did you know that the production of your morning cup of coffee requires 140 litres of water, while a cotton shirt necessitates 2700 litres of water? This puts Europe in an extremely imbalanced position, using more of the water needed by those in the countries producing the goods we use than they get for themselves, creating situations of water stress.

Within Europe, water is a serious concern. There is always word of droughts and water scarcity in southern Europe, however are seem to be becoming more common place further north with diminishing usable groundwater resources. Were you aware that several areas of England currently hold drought status? It’s been a drier than average year on the Continent as well, with areas of Finland and Sweden receiving less than 25 per cent of their normal precipitation between September and November 2011. With such a serious problem on our hands, surely this is something we should be more aware of and take more action to prevent the consequences becoming any more serious.

Water efficiency is therefore vitally important to a sustainable future. There are several options; my favourite of these is smart water metering. Although difficult to implement in certain circumstances, this would allow people to see how much water they are using and adds a financial incentive to use less as they are being charged based on their usage – which can be reported in real time. Smart water meters also create an incentive to stop excessive use of water and prevent leaks within the home (not that there should be any need for added incentive there).

If water metering becomes the norm, it might also encourage us to attempt grey water recycling and rain water harvesting (RWH) as well. Both of these are extremely important, however they are still in stages where more research is required. Simple systems remain the best – a humble water butt for watering the garden or washing a car, using washing up water to water the garden is another option, and in times of little rain, this proves more reliable – but it does depend on your washing up method – a plastic bowl is necessary.

RWH and grey water recycling, in more complex terms than a water butt, can begin to use energy, and therefore carbon, which presents a dilemma. As soon as pumps are introduced to move collected water, energy is required. We must do better than that. A catalysing boost to the research in this field is needed. Maybe research could be funded within the climate action, resource efficiency and raw materials focus of Horizon 2020, the EU’s research funding instrument? As 60 per cent of our current housing stock will still be in use in 2050, we therefore have no excuse for not incorporating retrofitting into a course of action, but it needs careful consideration. Implementing these systems in new builds is easier than manoeuvring around existing piping and listed building restrictions.

Another way of increasing efficiency is to incorporate efficient appliances in new builds and implementing new systems in old buildings. Research has shown that using aerated taps, water efficient toilet cisterns (using either six litres per flush, or a dual 4l/2l flush system), integrated toilet and sinks, flow-reducing shower heads and ‘hippo the watersaver’ cistern bricks can, when combined increase our water efficiency by approximately 32l per person per day. In tandem with implementation of smart meters, this would help to inform citizens about their water use and change habits.

Our water habit is as detrimental as our carbon dependency – I need to feel as guilty about wasting water as I do about using fossil fuels. If we react to drought warnings and begin to reduce our water use, there is no reason the situation cannot be turned around. More information needs to be out there at a higher visibility to the public to create awareness and instigate understanding and behaviour change. Why not give the EU some more to think about by responding to their current consultation on water efficiency in buildings? QCEA will shortly be posting a response on our website, help multiply our voice by adding yours.